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APPLYING SOCIAL MOVEMENT THEORY TO NONHUMAN RIGHTS 




This paper offers an exploratory analysis of social movement theory as it relates to the 
nonhuman animal rights movement.  Individual participant motivations and experiences, 
movement resource mobilization, and movement relationships with the public, the political 
environment, historical context, countermovements, and the media are discussed.  In particular, 
the hierarchical relationships between factions are highlighted as an important area for further 
research in regards to social movement success. Specifically, the role of counterframing in 
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Introduction and Definitions 
 
This article aims to address major themes in social movement theory (SMT) in their applicability 
to the modern nonhuman animal rights movement with a special consideration of the relevance 
of hierarchical relationships among factions.  A multitude of social movement definitions exist, 
but, for the purpose of this paper, a social movement will refer to conscious, sustained efforts to 
enact social change using extra-institutional means (Goodwin and Jasper, 2003).  This definition 
is distinct from consensus movements that tend to be widely supported by the public and the 
state and are largely free from opposition (Schwartz and Shuva, 1992).  This also distinguishes 
social movements from interest groups that also enact social change but rely heavily on 
legitimated channels for social change, namely through political lobbying (Clemens, 1997).   
 
As such, the nonhuman animal rights movement, active since the mid-nineteenth century, can be 
considered a social movement as it has struggled to improve conditions for nonhumans despite 
considerable resistance using moral suasion, consumer boycott, protest, and other forms of direct 
action (Beers, 2006; Guither, 1998; Jasper, 1992).  Furthermore, the nonhuman rights movement 
might be considered as part of a larger wave of “new” social movements characterized by a 
democratic structure, rejection of traditional means for social change, and claimsmaking focused 
on rights and quality of life (Dalton and Kuechler, 1990).  Political power, no longer 
monopolized by the state, is increasingly wielded by organizations (Tilly, 1984).  The 
abolitionist faction of nonhuman animal rights, in particular, highlights the need for democratic 
access to decision making.  For instance, a prominent abolitionist theorist, Gary Francione, 
explicitly rejects the need for professionalization or leadership:  “We do not need large 
organizations whose employees get fat salaries and subsidized travel. Every one of us can be a 
‘leader.’ If we are to succeed, every one of us must be a leader, an important force for change. 
Every one of us has the ability to affect and influence the lives of others” (2007).  Indeed, this 
tension between moderate and radical movement structure characterizes nonhuman liberation 
efforts.  Francione’s comment critiques a modernized social movement that has largely 
professionalized and harkens to the power in grassroots mobilization and individual contribution 
traditionally associated with collective action on behalf of nonhumans.   
 
Earnest mobilization for the protection of nonhumans began in Victorian Britain and America, 
where wealthy aristocrats, involved with other moral crusades and having the resources to spare, 
became concerned with the treatment of urban working horses and the particularly abhorrent 
methods used by cities to "dispose” of stray dogs.
1
  Gradually, concern for nonhuman welfare 
extended to other species as well.  Upton Sinclair’s novel, The Jungle, while intended to raise 
awareness to worker conditions (and while ultimately most effective in raising awareness about 
food safety), was successful in revealing to the public the previously shrouded reality of 
slaughterhouse operations.  Writing a decade before him, in 1892, Henry Salt penned a treatise 
on rights for other animals, drawing on the human rights mobilizations of his time that 
recognized the personhood of those considered property.  Many other human rights activists and 
reformers of the nineteenth century had seriously considered the treatment and use of other 
animals.  The communal Alcott house of New England, Fruitlands, operated not only as a stop 
on the Underground Railroad, but required veganism of its residents (Francis, 2010).  Not only 
were the flesh, eggs, and lactations of other animals eschewed, but even their labor and manure.  
                                                          
1
 In New York City, for example, dogs were corralled into a large cage and drowned in the river (Beers, 2006). 
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Vegetarian and vegan experiments did abound during this era, sometimes following trends in 
romanticism or religious purity, but other times explicitly recognizing the correlations between 
the experiences of humans and other animals and the desire to extend moral consideration 
(Davis, 2010). 
 
Thus, the human social reforms over the past two centuries were hugely influential in early 
mobilization efforts for other animals.  As the nonhuman animal rights movement has struggled 
for legitimacy, it perhaps quite intentionally draws on human rights discourse to garner 
claimsmaking strength.  Connection to human rights has indeed been successful for other 
disadvantaged movements in bolstering their legitimacy (Brysk, 1994).  While many applied 
abolitionist anti-slavery rhetoric to nonhumans (Beers, 2006) and suffragettes eagerly adopted 
vegetarianism as congruent with their challenge to patriarchal oppression (Leneman, 1997), it 
was not until the mid twentieth century that nonhuman liberation gained a significant political 
presence (Guither, 1998).  As activists of the Civil Rights movement began to challenge the 
exclusion of women, homosexuals, and African Americans from the rights discourse, so too did 
nonhuman advocates who pushed the boundaries of moral consideration to include other species 
as well.  Women’s rights advocates, for example, call for the accommodation of gender nuances 
and specifically female interests (rape, domestic violence, sex education) in human rights 
claimsmaking (Stephen, 1997).  Similarly, then, advocates of other animals insist on the 
accommodation of species. 
 
Just as the inclusion of these new human demographics required a reconstructing of eligibility 
requirement, protest strategies, and goal demands to reflect new demographics, the extension of 
rights to other species necessitated new considerations as well.  Importantly, for any oppressed 
group, but particularly for nonhuman animals, just who is being represented and who can be 
counted as a representative has required definition and is still without consensus.  Animal 
advocates of yesteryear focused largely on highly visible, urban nonhumans who were not used 
for food.  But, a century later, with the rise of factory farming systems and the subsequent release 
of Peter Singer’s Animal Liberation in the early 1970s, nonhuman advocates began to widen 
their circle of concern to include nonhumans raised for food as well.  Indeed, the very notion of a 
human/nonhuman (and human privileging) divide in the hierarchically constructed realm of 
moral consideration is being challenged (Adams and Donovan, 1995; Wolfe, 2003). 
 
While the scope of nonhuman animal representation varies by individual and organization, most 
liberationist advocates and groups today focus on any number of species impacted by human 
activities.  While human interference tends to be a prerequisite for representation, however, 
groups may also discriminate based on a litany of qualities when determining how far to cast 
their net of representation.  For example, according to Francione, “animals” are differentiated 
from non-animals in their capacity for sentience or self-awareness.  Francione’s definition of 
sentience also requires an ability to feel pleasure and pain and to hold interests and preferences.   
Any animal that is sentient would be eligible for representation.  This is coupled with Regan’s 
notion of a “subject of life” whereby, to be included under rights mobilization efforts, a 
nonhuman animal would need the ability to “perceive and remember,” “act intentionally in 
pursuit of their desires or goals,” and possess “beliefs, desires, and preferences,” a “sense of their 
own future,” and a “psychophysical identity over time” (Regan, 2004, p. 264).  However, 
Regan’s notion of animality tends to be overly particular and necessarily excludes many sentient 
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beings about whose subjective experiences we have little understanding.  Moreover, as Francione 
argues, many of these characteristics exclude sentient beings (including many humans) who 
might still benefit from protected rights regardless of their capacity for complex cognitive 
functions listed in Regan’s definition.  Therefore, it is perhaps wiser to adhere to Francione’s 
more inclusive definition which relies on sentience alone in affording rights.  And, for those 
nonhuman animals for whom we are uncertain in regards to their sentience, Francione suggests 
we err on the side of caution and include them as well.  This definition is important because once 
an animal is regarded as non-sentient or not a subject of life, it follows that other rights holders 
might justifiably use them as resources.   
 
As illustrated in the debate over moral inclusion, what is “animal” is socially constructed.  
Consequently, the nonhuman movement varies on its representation of animals.  Some attempt to 
represent all sentient animals, including humans and insects.  Others focus only on nonhuman 
animals and exclude nonhumans of lower complexity.  Still others focus primarily on popular 
species such as monkeys and apes, cats and dogs, or whales and dolphins.  But generally, 
nonhuman animal rights advocates seek to extend those rights traditionally granted to humans—
the consideration of interests—to incorporate other sentient beings who share a capacity to suffer 
and thus possess interests to speak of.  Like other oppressed groups who have struggled for 
inclusion in rights discourse, newcomer claimsmaking will reflect that demographic’s unique 
interests and identity.  So, while women might struggle for the consideration of sexual violence 
in the rights discourse, nonhuman animals, alternatively, might have a vested interest in not 
being used exploited as food, labor, test subjects, or entertainment. 
 
The types of interests that should be considered—and, likewise, who is considered an 
appropriate proxy in representing nonhumans—are additional points of contention.  The hugely 
diverse nonhuman animal rights movement sees advocates taking a variety of stances with 
regards to human-nonhuman relationships.  To be considered an advocate, it is not enough that 
one simply represent the interests of nonhuman animals.  Such a definition would suggest that 
vivisectors and farmers that practice good “husbandry” might be considered advocates.  
Similarly, “conservationist” sportsmen that mobilize to protect hunting habitats might also be 
included.  Therefore, for the purposes of this article, nonhuman animal rights activists will be 
defined as those who seek to relieve nonhumans from their oppressive conditions with a focus on 
individual rights for nonhumans that are unrelated to whatever function they might serve humans 
or the ecosystem.  Such a definition would exclude any who do not seek to liberate nonhumans, 
who treat nonhumans as objects and resources, or who view nonhumans holistically as part of a 
larger ecosystem with no claims to rights as individuals.  Thus, many nonhuman and 
environmental “protection” groups (the Humane Society of the United States and the Sierra 
Club, for example) would be excluded. 
 
With the definitions of nonhuman animals, nonhuman advocates, nonhuman rights, and the 
nonhuman movement attended to, we can begin to locate nonhuman advocacy within the sphere 
of social movement studies.  Such an exploration might be organized in a number of ways (by 
following the historical progression of social movement studies, by discussing clusters of related 
theories, etc.), but this paper will deconstruct SMT as a micro-level/individual experience, a 
meso-level/group experience, and, finally, as a subject of larger, macro-level influences.  While 
participation in a social movement is sometimes a personal decision and personal costs and 
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benefits will be experienced, the decision to participate is often mediated by social pulls (a 
critical mass, networks, a culture, etc.).  The individual and group experience of collective action 
must always contend with larger social (or natural) influences such as political regimes, 
competition among social movements, environmental disasters, historical forces, etc.  Thus, the 
nonhuman animal rights movement, typical of other movements, recognizes that the choice to 
mobilize for nonhumans is ultimately an individual choice (particularly for this group, as many 
are recruited with no preexisting networks) and that the individual will experience profound 
identity transformations (some of which may indeed be negative).  This movement also 
recognizes the importance of strategy in professionalized organization and the nurturing of a 
movement culture to foster group cohesiveness, movement strength, and resourcefulness.  But 
macro-scale realities also shape a movement, and nonhuman advocates must face prevailing 
ideologies of speciesism, countermovement from nonhuman exploitative industries, competing 




Ultimately, any social movement is comprised of individual participants.  Some may be 
comprised of only a few committed and resourceful persons, while others might lay claim to 
hundreds of thousands of perhaps more loosely committed members.  The experience and 
resources the participating individual has available to contribute (and could potentially gain) also 
varies, as do their motivations and expectations.  In nonhuman animal mobilization, the personal 
motivations vary considerably.  Because nonhumans lack the ability to mobilize on their own 
behalf, humans have intervened as proxies.  This inherent disconnect between nonhumans and 
their representatives creates a potential disincentive to participation that is somewhat unique to 
the nonhuman movement.  Yet, many oppressed groups, such as human slaves, children, and 
women, have been historically without voice or power and would be severely limited in their 
ability to mobilize as well.  Fortunately, social movements (the nonhuman animal rights 
movement included) have been able to circumvent this disadvantage and create meaningful 
change for their constituency (Beers, 2006).  Of course, this is not to say that human slaves, 
women, and other disadvantaged subjects of social change have not been able to act on their own 
behalf.  Even nonhuman animals have been active participants in their emancipation as 
documented in countless instances of resistance (Hribal, 2010). 
 
Regardless, even for those in more privileged or advantageous positions, social movement 
participation almost always entails a certain degree of cost and risk that must be overcome.  
Thus, the decision to participate is not simply a knee-jerk reaction to grievances, but is thought to 
require some degree of consideration.  Given that significant disincentives would be expected to 
incapacitate social movement mobilization, social movement theorists have expended 
considerable attention to uncovering what motivates certain individuals to participate and others 
to free-ride (to abstain from participation but to nonetheless reap the benefits achieved by others 
who participate and incur those costs and risks).  Some have applied a basic theory of rational 
choice which frames the decision to participate as one that is made by weighing potential costs 
against potential benefits.  Potential costs for the nonhuman movement, for example, might 
include significant social stigmatization (Iacobbo and Iacobbo, 2006), legal persecution (Lovitz, 
2010; Potter, 2011), and limited socioeconomic or geographic access to vegan alternatives 
(Harper, 2010).  If the advocates do not stand to gain any direct benefits from liberating 
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nonhumans, these costs might be amplified.  The collective good that advocates hope to 
achieve—equal consideration for all sentient beings—might not resonate with a deeply speciesist 
society.  As such, many advocates also reiterate the interconnected nature of oppression for 
humans and nonhumans alike and also draw on the desire for environmental and human health 
benefits that would directly benefit the larger public. 
 
Fortunately, researchers have identified several other potential individual benefits from social 
movement participation that could compensate for these costs and risks and encourage collective 
behavior.   First, the achievement of a critical mass is thought to encourage participation (Chong, 
1992; Gerald and Oliver, 1993).  When enough individuals are participating, risks and costs are 
distributed more widely and are significantly diminished for each person.  Critical mass also 
creates a culture that normalizes that social movement behavior.  Similarly, individuals are more 
likely to participate if they suspect success is likely and that their involvement will be influential 
(Finkel, Muller, and Opp, 1989).  Second, individuals are thought to undergo some degree of 
political learning.  That is, individuals will consider their past experiences with mobilization to 
determine the utility of future participation (Macy, 1990).  Again, the perception that their 
involvement was influential is important.  It has also been considered that extreme repression can 
sometimes overpower any individual hesitations related to risks and costs, encouraging 
mobilization despite the disincentives (Opp and Roehl, 1990).  What’s more, some individuals 
may participate to intentionally face the risks of participation.  Some researchers have argued 
that the celebration of risk-taking and sacrifice for the greater good actually works as a status 
reward (Willer, 2009).  
 
To be sure, the identity gained from participation can become a powerful incentive.   Prestige 
and reputation gained from participating can override immediate self-interest (Muller and Opp, 
1986).  Likewise, as seen in lesbian and gay mobilization efforts, the community and sense of 
belonging that a movement can elicit becomes a potent motivator (Armstrong, 2002; Bernstein, 
1997).  Animal activists also report experiencing heightened self-confidence and enriched, more 
meaningful lives (Gaarder, 2008).  It should be noted, however, that this acquired identity can 
also become a detriment.   Many nonhuman activists, for instance, are labeled by the public, 
countermovements, and the state as irrational, terroristic, or overly emotional.  Indeed, 
emotionality plays a controversial role in nonhuman advocacy.  While emotion is hugely 
important in motivating participation for any social movement (Goodwin, Jasper, and Polletta, 
2001), it is particularly salient in nonhuman animal rights participation (DeCoux, 2009).  But 
emotion can also work to delegitimize movement claims if participant identities are gendered 
and negatively perceived.  This is a common occurrence in the largely female nonhuman animal 
liberation movement (Einwohner, 1999; Gaarder, 2011).  So, while participation in nonhuman 
advocacy is largely motivated by an emotional response (Jasper and Poulsen, 1995), the negative 
stereotypes of irrationality attributed to female participants are notable risks to consider 
(Gaarder, 2008).  For this reason, many advocates of nonhumans adhere to highly rational, 
reasoned arguments to counter the risk to identities (Groves, 2001).  Furthermore, identity can 
also deter recruitment in creating an identity that is too exclusive.  Creating a vegan or 
liberationist identity, for example, necessarily otherizes the larger, speciesist public who also act 
as the activists’ recruitment pool (Maurer, 2002).  This occurs within the movement as well.  The 
abolitionist faction, for example, has been criticized for protecting exclusivity at the cost of 
alienating and repelling other nonhuman advocates (Yates, 2012).  Radical factions that, by their 
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nature, criticize moderated movement activity and must protect and differentiate their position 
from that of the moderate group could be creating a negative and unwelcoming identity. 
 
Given high opportunity costs and the potential for identity and emotion to become detrimental, 
group solidarity becomes critical in sustaining participation.  Individuals must be bound together 
in some way to sustain and protect their involvement.  Nonhuman advocacy, in particular, is 
heavily reliant on networks to recruit and maintain members (Cherry, 2006).  Increasingly, 
transnational networking has become an important resource for nonhuman animal rights 
advocates, particularly for smaller, radical factions. Thus, advocates struggle to create an identity 
that is nurturing to participants, while, at the same time, not so exclusive that it discourages new 
participants from joining.  As we have seen, advocates must also contend with outside 
counterclaims to their identity that can undermine the movement’s authority.  Strong, inclusive 
networks, then, carry much potential in reducing costs associated with participation and 
overcoming free-riding (Diani, 2004). 
 
Social Movement Agency 
 
While individual decisions and contributions are important in understanding how movements 
coalesce and sustain, social movements are ultimately collective endeavors.  Group processes 
vary significantly between social movements, and how a movement mobilizes available 
resources is linked to its ability to attain its goals (McCarthy and Zald, 1977).  Consequently, 
resource mobilization theory has dominated the social movement literature as a means of 
analyzing movement agency in determining outcome (Jenkins, 1983).  Just as individuals are 
expected to participate given some degree of rational consideration, movements, too, are thought 
to behave more or less rationally when navigating their environments in pursuit of social change.  
Movements negotiate externally with the public, the state, other social movements, and 
countermovements.  They also exhibit factionalism and tussle internally among themselves for 
the power to create meanings and to frame problems.  Resource mobilization presumes that 
grievances are normal and therefore looks beyond individual incentives to participate, grappling 
instead with the difficult problem of how collective action manipulates resources to achieve 
goals (Foweraker, 1995). 
 
As such, movements have some ability to manipulate societal culture and create supportive 
ideologies that legitimize their claimsmaking (Eckstein, 2001).  Significantly, nonhuman animal 
rights mobilization, since the nineteenth century, has been successful in creating a culture that is 
much more sensitive to nonhuman animal interests (Beers, 2006; Ryder, 2000).  Since the 1970s, 
the concept of nonhuman animal “rights” has become increasingly familiar with the general 
public.  The mainstreaming and normalization of concern for nonhuman animals, intentionally 
produced by decades of mobilization efforts, has certainly created an environment much more 
conducive to future movement activities.  However, over time, these movement activities also 
run the risk of falling into certain path dependencies whereby movements become locked into 
procedures and repertoires initiated many years prior.  Deviation from these routines becomes 
increasingly difficult as time passes and movements become invested in particular behaviors.  
The cultures and ideologies they have fostered begin to cement.  For example, a movement that 
has historically structured itself for the purpose of mobilizing financial donations will have 
difficulty adapting to mobilize grassroots activism (Oliver and Marwell, 1992).  Piven and 
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Cloward (1977) are particularly critical of organization for these reasons.  Organizations, they 
argue, are prone to internal oligarchy, external cooptation, moderated tactics and goals, and the 
unfortunate rejection of influential radical mobilization.  Professionalization aggravates these 
tendencies as moderation is especially favored to maximize constituencies.   A related effect of 
moderating is the diversion of significant percentages of acquired resources to self-maintenance 
(Edwards and Marullo, 1995).  This is where Francione’s criticisms of professionalized 
nonhuman animal rights organizations can be placed.  Francione (1996) underscores moderated 
goals and tactics as a significant compromise to nonhuman animal rights.  Out of regard for 
“purely pragmatic self interests,” he argues, “[…] large, wealthy animal organizations […] are 
more concerned with the size of their donor bases than with the moral message that they 
promote” (Francione and Garner, 2010, p. 74).  Bearing out Piven and Cloward’s concerns with 
organizations, abolitionism is blunted by hegemonic movement powers.  So, both path 
dependency and active moderation could be at work in coalescing professionalized movement 
power to the point of self-imposed inflexibility.  In such situations of stunted movement activity, 
however, those excluded radical factions are actually critical in refocusing movement goals and 
inspiring tactical innovations (Gerlach, 1999; Wrenn, 2011). 
 
While radical factions play an important role in social movement health, they have not always 
been welcomed favorably.  Factionalism tends to be underscored as a significant detriment to 
movement success, particularly in that it diverts crucial resources to infighting (Benford, 1993).  
As we have seen, the abolitionist animal rights faction has been criticized for its extreme 
exclusivity that may be severely limiting its ability to expand (Yates, 2012).  Thus, to measure 
movement success (or lack thereof), it is certainly important to examine variations in resource 
mobilization between movements.  But, also, the interactions among internal factions are a 
critical component as well.  The nonhuman animal rights movement is not unlike many other 
social movements in its exhibition of many sharply divided factions (Zald and Ash, 1966).  It is 
typical for movements to splinter and regroup in reaction to conflicts over perceived problems, 
accepted solutions and tactics, and methods in mobilization (Benford and Snow, 2000).  So, for 
example, while advocates are united under the shared aim of nonhuman animal advocacy, they 
are sharply divided over the end goal of either liberation or reform and over the legitimacy of 
various tactics (direct action, violence, nonviolence, vegan outreach, etc.).  Critical of the 
moderated tactics and goals of the professionalized nonhuman movement, Francione (1996) has 
outlined a radical, abolitionist approach that refocuses nonhuman advocacy on eliminating 
nonhuman animal use entirely with a particular emphasis on veganism as a moral requirement 
for achieving this end.  In line with Piven and Cloward, Francione explicitly rejects the need for 
organizations, and, in fact, explicitly discourages their use altogether. 
 
While agendas and claimsmaking certainly differ, how resources are mobilized by nonhuman 
animal rights factions varies considerably as well.  As we have seen, the mainstream movement, 
having largely professionalized, tends to focus on the more dependable solicitation of financial 
donations and media representation.  The direct action or “militant” faction, namely represented 
by the Animal Liberation Front (ALF) and symbolized by iconographic ski-masked men dressed 
in black, often relies on property damage (Foreman and Haywood, 1993; Love and Obst, 1971), 
open releases (An Animal Liberation Primer, n.d.), intimidation (“haunting” and “harassment” as 
they call it) (Morgan, 1980), and even direct violence as amply illustrated in handbooks on 
munitions, bombs, and other weapons (Improvised Munitions Handbook, n.d.).  Through 
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physical harm to other humans, destruction of property, and emotional terror, this faction hopes 
to create social change through force and fear.  Such a tactical repertoire also tends to reject the 
utility of nonviolence.  This is explained in one essay promoted on an online ALF library: 
The ideology of nonviolence creates effects opposite to what it promises.  As a result 
nonviolence ideologists cooperate in […] continued repression of the powerless […].  To 
minimize violence we must adopt a pragmatic, reality-based method of operation.  
(Meyers, 2000:  1).   
Not surprisingly, such an approach requires that they operate in relative secrecy.  Subsequently, 
this faction receives little, if any, public support from the professionalized and moderated 
mainstream organizations (Guither, 1998).   
 
The abolitionist faction, alternatively, rejects both the moderate claimsmaking of the mainstream 
movement and the violent tendencies of the direct action faction, relying instead on nonviolent 
vegan outreach and moral suasion (Francione and Garner, 2010).  Both moderation and violence 
are thought to be counterproductive.  The compromises of professionalized organizations are 
seen to undermine goals of nonhuman liberation in supporting exploitative industries and 
creating consumer complacency.  Violent liberationist tactics, on the other hand, are thought to 
alienate the public, incite state repression, and run counterintuitive to values of peace, equality, 
and respect (Hall, 2006).  Drawing on the abolitionist language of the anti-slavery movement that 
preceded it and recognizing the intersectional nature of oppressions for both humans and 
nonhumans alike, abolitionists call for a complete cessation of nonhuman animal use with a 
preference for education, outreach, and the adoption of veganism (Boyd, 1987).
2
  In many ways, 
Francione’s abolitionist approach does mirror the human abolitionists of the past, particularly in 
its reliance on moral suasion and nonviolent tactics.  Yet, human abolitionists did sometimes 
utilize violence and were often involved in legal mobilization (Quarles, 1969).  What’s more, the 
work of human abolitionists is far from done (slavery in so many ways resurfaced in 
sharecropping and later in the discriminatory prison system).  Advocacy today focuses on 
desegregation, combating racist ideology, improving educational opportunities, and securing 
other basic freedoms (Davis, 2006; Lewis, 1995).  Nonhuman abolitionists, however, remain 
focused on attacking the property status of other animals.  Though, like their human abolitionist 
counterparts, nonhuman abolitionists do emphasize the importance of attacking oppressive 
ideologies that support institutionalized enslavement and speciesism. 
 
The Social Movement Environment 
 
Thus far we have seen the relatively rationalized behaviors of individuals, movements, and their 
factions in determining the formation and structure of collective action.   But, clearly, the 
nonhuman animal rights movement, like any social movement, does not operate in a vacuum.  
Here, proponents of political opportunity structure challenge the shortcomings of resource 
mobilization in failing to account for macro-scale realities (Koopmans, 1999; McAdam, 
McCarthy, and Zald, 1996).  There will always be some degree of environmental influence that 
lies outside the control of the individual and the group that either provides or impedes 
opportunity.  Furthermore, movement agency is highly influenced by that movement’s history 
                                                          
2
 The appropriation of human abolitionist language has garnered some degree of controversy in that Francione, who 
developed the terminology for nonhuman animal rights purposes, has largely failed to place the term historically or 
within the discourse of ongoing human abolitionist mobilization (The Vegan Police, 2011). 
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(Eckstein, 2001; Rubin, 2004) and its relationship to larger cultural forces and the social 
movement climate in general.  The nonhuman movement, for instance, has a solid history of 
responding to highly visible cruelties suffered by urban species.  This has certainly worked to 
maintain a movement that is largely concerned with reforming human-nonhuman relationships.  
Liberationist claimsmaking only surfaced in response to the energy and influence of the Civil 
Rights movement.  Thus, the movement’s history has created particular path dependencies in 
goals and tactics that continue to structure the movement’s decision making today.   
 
Political climate, too, will shape a movement’s structure and trajectory.  In the mid-nineteenth 
century, for example, the nonhuman movement gained legitimacy in drawing on the 
claimsmaking discourse of the relatively successful human abolitionist movement (Beers, 2006).  
The American Temperance movement, and subsequently, the Progressive movement, also 
created a political and cultural environment conducive to drawing attention to nonhuman animal 
issues.  Later, riding the success of the Civil Rights and environmental movements of the 1960s, 
the nonhuman movement experienced a renaissance as the public was especially receptive to 
claims that extended concern to the nonhuman realm.  Recently, however, the post-September 
11
th 
atmosphere has heightened state sensitivity to disruptive domestic activism.  For instance, 
the 1992 Animal Enterprise Protection Act was amended in 2006 and renamed the Animal 
Enterprise Terrorism Act, effectively criminalizing any nonhuman activism that financially 
interferes with nonhuman industries (Lovitz, 2010).  So, while activism on behalf of other 
animals carries on, participants and potential participants alike are keenly aware of the increased 
risks associated with their activism (Potter, 2011).  This could be deterring and muting collective 
action to some extent (Lovitz, 2010).  Certainly, then, political opportunities, or lack thereof, can 
influence a movement’s ability to successfully mobilize.  Other large social and environmental 
factors could also impact a movement’s success.  The Western health crisis associated with rich 
diets high in nonhuman animal products has introduced many to vegan and vegetarian diets 
(Marsh, Zeuschner, and Saunders, 2012).  Likewise, the growing concern over climate change 
has increasingly come to include nonhuman animal agriculture as a primary culprit (Goodland 
and Anhang, 2009).   
 
Another influential factor in the social movement environment, and largely outside the control of 
participants and groups, is the inevitable mobilization of countermovements.  Often concerned 
with preserving the status quo, countermovements emerge to protect taken-for-granted social 
structures and ideologies (Jasper and Poulsen, 1993).  Thus, social movements are often 
obligated to address the counter-claimsmaking and adjust their framing and repertoires 
accordingly.  As Jasper and Poulsen (1993) uncovered when exploring nonhuman animal rights 
interactions with opposing mobilizations, countermovements can become a key variable in 
explaining movement successes or failures.  So, the nonhuman rights movement must combat 
countermovement mobilization in addition to fighting for resources, recruitment, and social 
change.  Exploitative industries work to actively defame nonhuman activists (Gorski, 2011), 
portraying them as detriments to human well-being, hindrances to scientific progress (Smith, 
2010), or, as noted above, violent extremists.  Much of this countermovement activity is 
conducted by highly organized and well-funded agribusiness, bio-medical industries, and 
recreational “sportsmen” (Sorenson, 2006) with powerful ties to the state (Lovitz, 2010). 
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Movements must also contend with public perceptions and media portrayals (Gamson, 2004).  
As discussed previously, countermovement and public misconceptions about a movement’s 
identity can become problematic.  However, the media’s selection process can be particularly 
troublesome when deciding which movements and protests will be covered with a tendency to 
favor powerful interests and the status quo (Oliver and Myers, 1999).  However, movements 
must utilize the media as it is an invaluable resource in diffusing claimsmaking and mobilizing 
participation.  Moreover, independent media outlets offer venue and voice for otherwise 
marginalized groups (Ryan, 2005).  The abolitionist faction, as we have seen, is largely excluded 
from the larger nonhuman movement’s claimsmaking process, but, abolitionism is able to utilize 
affordable, free-access media resources like self-printed literature or the Internet to overcome 
internal movement barriers.  The Internet, in particular, “[…] has lowered the opportunity costs 
of communication and has facilitated networking among similarly minded activists, who can 
bypass the large organizations and their efforts to control the discourse about issues” (Francione 
and Garner, 2010, p. 67).  That said, the power regained from circumventing traditional channels 
and instead utilizing online forums might result in a situation of cyberbalkanization as increased 
control over claimsmaking can lead some groups to promote their agendas to the absolute 
exclusion of opposing approaches (Alstyne and Brynjolfsson, 2005).  The abolitionist movement, 
in its problems with exclusivity, must certainly contend with this.  However, the very nature of 
abolitionist nonhuman rights claimsmaking—that being the vested interest in monitoring 
professionalized and violent organizations and tactics—combats, to some extent, the potential for 
cyberbalkanization.  Indeed, abolitionism is very often engaged in rigorous debate with other 
groups and individuals within the nonhuman animal rights arena (Francione and Garner, 2010). 
 
Yet, despite the power in media representation, movements need to be wary of how media bias 
can misconstrue the movement to their detriment.  While culture and ideology can be products of 
social movement mobilization, preexisting counter-ideologies and unreceptive cultures are a 
social reality that movements must address and attempt to resonate with.  The nonhuman animal 
rights movement in particular enjoys extremely few positive media representations.  In fact, 
many liberation or vegan claims are ignored entirely, or reframed in ways that support the 
interests of nonhuman exploitative industries (Blaxter, 2009; Cole and Morgan, 2011; Freeman, 
2009; Freeman, Beckoff, and Bexell, 2011).  However, media coverage continues to be a favored 
tactic in the nonhuman movement.  People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals (PETA), for 
example, operates under the assumption that any coverage, even if negative, must be good for the 
movement in eliciting attention and perhaps provoking the audience to consider the issues 
(PETA, n.d.).  Regardless, resonance with an indifferent or unfavorable public sphere is a 
leading challenge for nonhuman rights activists. 
 
The Impact of Factionalism 
 
The nonhuman animal rights movement, then, is a collective group that must contend with a 
multitude of factors in its goal for achieving nonhuman liberation.  Some of those factors are 
within its control, but many are not.  Importantly, however, this movement also faces the 
additional challenge of inter-movement competition.  While many social movements experience 
the problems associated with competing for limited attention and resources with similar 
organizations in their field (indeed, many organizations within a field will actually begin to 
homogenize as a successful strategy becomes standard) (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983), the 
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nonhuman movement must contend with radical factions that are not only sharply critical of the 
moderated professionalized organizations, but are also competing for resources and 
claimsmaking space.   To be clear, other movements have experienced this phenomenon, as 
radical mobilization is certainly not unique to the nonhuman animal rights movement. The 
women’s movement, for example, enjoys a robust, moderate collectivity (generally associated 
with the most prominent group, the National Organization for Women), but contends with 
radical feminists who worry that the moderated movement has lost sight of important goals and 
ignores root causes of gender inequality.  The women’s movement, however, explicitly values 
difference, encourages all to participate, and gives weight to a variety of concerns (Lindsey, 
2010).  As a result, it has been suggested that the lack of unity and the leniency towards 
dissenting opinions have inhibited the success of the women’s movement (Epstein, 2003).   
 
Despite its place in the wave of new social movements, the nonhuman animal rights movement 
has no such cultural appreciation for democratic leadership.  It appears that, in accordance with 
Piven and Cloward’s apprehensions, organizational oligarchy has manifested to the detriment of 
movement progress.  Radical factions are largely excluded by hegemonic organizations like 
PETA, Farm Animal Rights Movement (FARM), Farm Sanctuary, and Vegan Outreach.  Indeed, 
these professionalized organizations are increasingly allocating resources to counter abolitionist 
claimsmaking and block their access to spheres of discourse.  For instance, in the summer of 
2012, dissatisfied with the moderated messages promulgated by the Animal Rights National 
Conference that is annually hosted by FARM to spotlight the agendas of professionalized 
organizations, a group of abolitionists attempted to hold their own smaller convention in the 
same venue at the same time as the larger conference.  After initially accepting their reservation, 
the hotel later shut down the abolitionist event at the behest of the Animal Rights National 
Conference organizers (LaVeck and Stein, 2012).  FARM later released a statement intended to 
“clear the air” and defame the offending radicals as “sideline pundits” (FARM, 2012). 
 
Thus, inter-movement tensions are a particular problem for collective action on behalf of other 
animals.  The radical abolitionists experience a significant amount of hegemonic exclusion and 
countermovement retaliation from the dominant animal groups despite their critical role in 
maintaining overall movement health.  But, also, and perhaps not unrelated, abolitionists must 
contend with the phenomenon of status contamination.  As larger organizations increasingly 
frame radical advocacy as deviant, unrealistic, and divisive, effectively demonizing radical 
tactics (Francione and Garner, 2010), one might expect that fewer advocates would be willing to 
identify with the abolitionist faction; the status of radical mobilization thus devalued and 
diminished, participants would presumably disassociate.  Alternatively, as professionalized 
organizations also co-opt many of the important symbols and claims made popular by radical 
advocacy and mold them into something congruent with their favored moderate tactics, radical 
activists must also concern themselves with the potential for their status as radicals to be 
“contaminated” with moderate claimsmaking.   In some ways, therefore, radical activists must 
engage in their own disassociation to protect their status, although, this might serve to aggravate 
the already disconcerting problem of hyper-exclusivity. 
 
  




The individual decision to participate in collective action is, to some extent, a result of carefully 
weighed costs and benefits.  Identity, emotion, and networks can influence these decisions and 
help counteract the potential to free-ride.  At the collective level, movements  can bring about 
change through strategized mobilization of available resources and the active creation of 
meaning, culture, and ideology.  As resource mobilization theorists have emphasized, how a 
movement frames problems and solutions can impact a movement’s identity and its ability to 
succeed.  Yet, conflicts over framing often encourage factionalism. Factionalism can operate as a 
useful motivation for the movement, but it can also act as a major drain on resources.  In the 
larger context of movement activity, movements operate in a fluctuating, reflexive relationship 
with their environment.  They could be paralyzed or invigorated from particular political, 
economic, social, or ecological climates.  Likewise, their actions and repertoires might be 
restricted by certain path dependencies that have crystallized over the course of the movement’s 
history. 
 
In regards to the nonhuman animal rights movement, it appears that factionalism, as a reflection 
of power hierarchies within the movement, could be the greatest impediment to goal attainment.  
Particularly, the active countermobilization on behalf of the professionalized organizations 
against abolitionism might prove a useful site for further exploration, as would the extreme 
exclusiveness perpetuated by the abolitionists themselves.  Issues with status contamination 
might also be a latent effect of these inter-movement tensions that could be polarizing factions 
and hindering recruitment.  Likewise, though not discussed in this paper, the possibility of 
concentrated power in the abolitionist faction (despite claims to reject professionalized 
organization and leadership in favor of democratic participation and grassroots mobilization), 
could help to explain limited movement success.  On the other hand, the literature on path 
dependency might inform goal attainment.  The professionalized nonhuman rights movement, 
for example, a product of approximately two hundred years of tradition, routine, and investment 
in reform, has had difficulty innovating tactics and claimsmaking.  The abolitionist faction, in 
relying on nonviolent moral suasion and vegan outreach, provides a radical alternative to the 
moderated repertoires of the mainstream nonhuman animal rights movement.  Radical factions 
might offer an important challenge to debilitating movement path dependencies.  The 
opportunities for future research in factional influence, then, are numerous.  A more thorough 
investigation into nonhuman animal mobilization could powerfully inform studies in social 
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